1 member will likely join the court during the next survey period, nothing from the current survey period suggests the court will alter its current limited approach to developing new doctrines under the Indiana Constitution. The supreme court held Indiana's right-to-work law does not violate article 1, section 21 of the Indiana Constitution by taking a person's "particular services" without compensation and the denial of transportation services did not violate the Education Clause of the Indiana Constitution. 2 Meanwhile, the court of appeals extended the law governing equal privileges and immunities into new areas and overturned several convictions sua sponte for violating Indiana's unique double jeopardy provision. The court of appeals also 3 invalidated a misdemeanor disorderly conduct conviction for violating the free speech provision and came to different conclusions on whether the State's 4 prohibition against synthetic drugs was unconstitutionally vague. Indianapolis defended the exception by arguing (1) that in excepting the applicability of the ordinance to the OTB, the City was entitled to defer to the State Horseracing Commission's decision to approve a tobacco management plan for the facility as part of the OTB's gaming license and (2) that the exception was not motivated by the City's receipt of gaming revenues as had been true in the Evansville case.
11
The trial court granted summary judgment for the City and the OTB. The 12 Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the City's proffered justification for treating the OTB and the plaintiff bar owners differently-the state regulation of the OTB-was too attenuated from the statutes at issue and from the stated purpose of the ordinance. It upheld all the other exceptions and severed the 13 OTB exception so that the ordinance would remain otherwise intact. of Appeals was confronted with claims that the Indiana Guest Statute-which prohibits negligence claims among family members and certain others arising from automobile accidents-violated article 1, sections 12 and article 1, section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. After finding the statute applied to foreclose a daughter's claim against the driver (her mother) notwithstanding the daughter's nominal payments for food and gas during the trip, the court held the statute violated neither constitutional provision. of a claim to vindicate a constitutional right played a role in excusing the property owner's pleading defect, but rather referred to the procedural mechanisms that were available to join the lienholder.
27
Zoeller v. Sweeney involved a constitutional challenge to the Indiana "right to-work" law. A union and several of its members sued the Indiana Attorney The supreme court's decision focused on two principle points. First, the 33 court held the right-to-work law's enforcement mechanisms did not "demand" services from unions within the meaning of that test announced in Bayh v. Sonnenburg. Rather, on the face of the statute there was no state demand for 34 services-the law merely prohibits employers from requiring union membership or the payment of monies as a condition of employment. Second, the court 35 rejected the union's argument that unions effectively had an obligation under federal labor law to represent all bargaining unit employees. The court held a 36 union's "federal obligation to represent all employees in a bargaining unit is optional; it occurs only when the union elects to be the exclusive bargaining agent, for which it is justly compensated by the right to bargain exclusively with the employer. court of appeals sustained the practice of high-fence hunting of privately owned whitetail deer by finding that relevant statutes did not give the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") authority to protect and manage wild animals legally owned or held in captivity under a license or permit. In construing the 38 applicable statutes to find a lack of regulatory authority conferred upon the DNR, the court avoided substantial inquiry into a constitutional question raised by the plaintiff game farm that the DNR had violated separation of powers principles in promulgating rules forbidding high-fence hunting. Chief Judge Vaidik the evidence was sufficient to support finding that funds requested by the city court judge were reasonably necessary for court operation and (2) a city court judge (as opposed to state superior courts and the Marion County Small Claims courts, which are all established solely by statute) was not required to adhere to procedural requirements of trial rules governing proceedings for mandate of funds. restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible." Jordan's conviction after a bench trial 60 stemmed from a verbal altercation after police pulled her over and decided to tow the vehicle for registration issues. Using the two-step inquiry from Barnes v. 
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State, the court found the officers restricted Jordan's expressive activity and her 62 expressive activity did not amount to a public nuisance.
63
The court rejected the State's argument that statements questioning why the officers asked Jordan whether she had a weapon, that the officers needed religion, and that they could not "'handle a Black woman'" were not political speech. Jordan's statement that she did not need to leave the scene, despite the court looks at "1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search and seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs." 75 First, the State did not suggest entry was founded upon a "concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation [had] Yet the defendant then committed a "new and distinct crime" when he battered the officer. Under the Fourth Amendment, excluding the evidence of 90 this crime served no purposes-it would not deter future police misconduct.
91
The court found the same applied under article 1, section 11-the defendant committed a "new crime" and thus the court properly admitted evidence of the battery even though police obtained the evidence after an illegal seizure. In a series of cases, the court of appeals found certain police conduct violated article 1, section 11, but reversed a trial court's order suppressing evidence in 95 State v. Terrell, finding a search was "not unreasonable" when the defendant 96 consented to the search, the police officer suspected the presence of a firearm, and the defendant was on probation. Similarly, in Bradley v. State, the court 97 98 of appeals found the police officers' belief that someone had apparent authority to consent to an entry of the home made an entry to the home reasonable under article 1, section 11. A subsequent protective sweep of the kitchen, given the 99 officers' high safety concerns, was also deemed reasonable. Judge Barnes dissented on the basis that article 1, section 13(b), a provision added in 1996, provides crime victims the constitutional right "to be informed of and present during public hearings and to confer with the prosecution, to the extent that exercising these rights does not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the accused." The prosecutor's failure to consult with the victim before the 105 plea agreement violated the victim's constitutional rights. Although the victim 106 did not control the prosecution of the plea bargaining process, the prosecutor could resubmit the plea agreement after consulting with the victim and give the 95 . See Garcia v. State, 25 N.E.3d 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a search of a small metallic cylinder in the pants pocket of an individual arrested for misdemeanor driving without a license was illegal because the officer had no safety concerns to justify opening the container and no reasonable suspicion that the container held illegal substances), vacated, 47 N.E.3d 1196 (Ind. 2016); Mundy v. State, 21 N.E.3d 114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding police entry past a driveway blocked by a padlocked cable, monitored by a security camera, and marked with a security sign and no trespassing sign was illegal); N.S. v. State, 25 N.E.3d 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding evidence discovered because of an illegal search was inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree").
96 did not develop an argument that the court's analysis should be different, the court applied the federal "critical stage" test which looks at whether a particular proceeding confronts the defendant with the "intricacies of the law" or the prosecutor's advocacy. Because the examination's scope and nature went only 111 to mental capacity and not to guilt, and because Esmond's counsel was on notice, the examination did not violate the right to counsel. The charging information failed to distinguish different quantities of drugs to support the possession and the dealing offenses. a reasonable possibility the evidence used by the fact-finder to establish battery may have also been used to establish a confinement. Hines had lunged towards a correctional officer, striking her in the ribs and pinning her to the wall. He 124 then hit her head against a filing cabinet or the wall, held her in a headlock, and held his hand over her mouth and face.
125
The court found this to be sufficient evidence to support both criminal confinement and battery; however, that did not end the case. The prohibition 126 against double jeopardy in Indiana requires the State to prosecute the case in a manner that assures multiple guilty verdicts do not rest on the same evidence. Where the "gravamen of the offense is causing the death or injury of another person," such as murder, manslaughter, battery, and reckless homicide, the result is part of the crime's definition. The court in Satterfield went a step further and found a defendant may also present evidence to rebut a State's presumption the defendant committed murder. The language of article 1, section 17 did not limit the evidence 146 admissible in such proceedings, and Indiana's Civil War-era precedents (the last time such showings were required before Fry) allowed defendants full constitutional due process rights in bail hearings. Thus, the trial court had to 147 review Satterfield's evidence that the victim forcefully attempted to enter the car holding a shiny object before Satterfield fired a single shot at him with his gun. override an Indiana law exempting life insurance policies from debtors' bankruptcy estate when the name beneficiary is a spouse, child, or other relative dependent on the debtor. Article 1, section 22 provides the privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale, for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter contracted: and there shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in case of fraud. 150 Indiana courts find this language "commands the legislature to enact exemptions," but also define them in reasonable, tangible ways that balance (Ind. 2009 )) (stating the seven factors to be "(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether it promotes the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether it has a rational alternative purpose; and (7) whether it is excessive in relation First, the court of appeals recognized the law imposed substantial affirmative disabilities and restraints on Ammons as he had to give up an array of personal information to the public.
The court noted the dissemination of that 165 information resembled a "shaming" that could extend from ten years to life. 166 Next, the court determined the law functioned punitively against Ammons because of registration's deterrent effect and the fact that when Ammons committed the offense, no registration requirements existed. The court 167 recognized that although the sanction is often linked to crimes requiring mens rea, Ammons's offense (child molesting) did not require scienter. Yet the court 168 determined registration advanced a non-punitive interest-protecting the public from repeat sexual crimes. Lastly, the court added the ability of an offender to 169 obtain an individualized determination based on the likelihood to reoffend made the law less punitive.
170
Although the court disclaimed relying on any particular factor as required by precedent, the court cited Ammons's ability to seek relief in concluding the law, as applied, did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Judge Barnes dissented on the basis that 
